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Consider a subject who is practically certain about every event in T ⊆P.
We model this believe with accept and reject statement-based uncertainty
models.
Aim: To investigate which conditions to impose on T in order to have a
coherent belief model.
Accept & reject statements
Accept & reject statements
The subject’s assessment A consists of two sets: his set of accepted
gambles A and his set of rejected gambles A≺.
X = {a,b}b
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Assessments of practical certainty
If a subject is practically certain that an event A will occur, we will take this
to mean that he is indifferent between IA and 1, or equivalently, between
IAc and 0.
⇒A A' := {IAc} is indifferent.
⇒A A = {±IAc} is acceptable.
If a subject is practically certain that every event in T will occur, we will
take this to mean that
A := {±IAc : A ∈T }
is acceptable. His assessment is A = 〈A; /0〉.
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Assessments of practical certainty









First rationality requirement Indifference to status quo: 0 ∈L≥0.
Assessments of practical certainty
Deductive closure
D = 〈posiB;B≺〉 with posiB = {f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IBf ≥ 0}
Here, CT :=
{⋂n
k=1Ak : n ∈ N,Ak ∈T
}
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Deductive closure
D = 〈posiB;B≺〉 with posiB = {f ∈L : (∃B ∈ CT )IBf ≥ 0}
Here, FT := {B ∈P : (∃C ∈ CT )C ⊆ B}
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Third rationality requirement: No Confusion⇔ /0 /∈ CT .









Fourth rationality requirement: No Limbo.
For this model, we have for any event A that
IAc ∈M'⇔ A ∈FT .
“Or” statements
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In the previous setting, we could deal with “and” statements:
If we are practically certain about events A and B, then we ought to be
practically certain about A∩B. [Conjunction]
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“Or” statements
Example: we toss a coin, that has 2 tails or 2
heads.
With (ph,pt) the probability mass function, we
have as credal setM = {(1,0),(0,1)}.
h t
(1,0) (0,1)
This is not a convex set.
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This is not a convex set.
With our language used, accept & reject statement-based uncertainty
models, we cannot express such beliefs.
As a possible solution, we look at choice functions C:
2L → 2L : A 7→ C(A ) the choice of the set of gambles A .
A choice function C is called coherent if and only if there is a probability
mass function p ∈M such that C(A ) are those gambles in A that
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This is not a convex set.
With our language used, accept & reject statement-based uncertainty
models, we cannot express such beliefs.
As a possible solution, we look at choice functions C:
2L → 2L : A 7→ C(A ) the choice of the set of gambles A .
A choice function C is called coherent if and only if there is a probability
mass function p ∈M such that C(A ) are those gambles in A that
maximise the expectation w.r.t. p.
